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Article 
Political Polarization and Moral Outrage on Social 
Media 
JORDAN CARPENTER, WILLIAM BRADY, MOLLY CROCKETT, RENÉ 
WEBER & WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG 
Many theorists claim that social media contribute to political polarization, 
but it is not clear how these effects occur. We propose and explain a theoretical 
model of this process that focuses on moral outrage. This combination of anger 
and disgust can emerge from a mismatch between evolved human nature and 
certain features of political discussions on the internet. We identify three specific 
types of socially negative behavior that moral outrage facilitates: aggression 
(behavior intended to harm others), sophistry (poor argumentation), and 
withdrawal (avoiding discussions of politics). We describe psychological 
mechanisms through which moral outrage can lead to these outcomes, specifically 
focusing on dehumanization and group antagonism. We discuss research justifying 
our proposed model and suggest new ways to empirically test its links. Our model 
should be useful for researchers exploring the question of when and how political 
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Political Polarization and Moral Outrage on Social 
Media 
JORDAN CARPENTER, WILLIAM BRADY, MOLLY CROCKETT, RENÉ WEBER 
& WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG * 
BACKGROUND 
Decades ago, experts hailed the internet as a grand, new opportunity 
for political enlightenment. It was thought that the web would provide a 
convenient and widely available way to remove limitations imposed by 
geography and resources, expanding access to information, increasing 
understanding and empathy among people, and making the world better. 
Today, this optimistic view is tempered by fears that certain aspects of 
internet use—most notably social media—have the potential to exacerbate 
threats to democracy, including political polarization.1  
Political polarization is sometimes understood merely as ideological 
distance between political parties or homogeneity within parties.2 
However, group coherence and disagreement by themselves are not the 
main problems here. The more threatening kind of polarization, which is 
often described as affective group polarization, involves intense, negative 
attitudes toward the political outgroup.3 According to Pew Research 
                                                                                                                     
* William Brady is an NSF postdoctoral fellow in the psychology department at Yale University. 
Jordan Carpenter is a postdoctoral fellow in the Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University. Molly 
Crockett is an Assistant Professor of Psychology at Yale University and a Distinguished Research 
Fellow at the Oxford Centre for Neuroethics, University of Oxford. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is the 
Chauncey Stillman Professor of Practical Ethics at Duke University in the Philosophy Department, the 
Kenan Institute for Ethics, the Psychology and Neuroscience Department, and the Law School. René 
Weber (M.D., University of Aachen, Germany; Ph.D. University of Technology Berlin, Germany) is a 
professor in the Department of Communication at the University of California in Santa Barbara, 
director of UCSB’s Media Neuroscience Lab (https://medianeuroscience.org), and a Fellow of the 
International Communication Association. 
1 William J. Brady & M.J. Crockett, How Effective Is Online Outrage?, 23 TRENDS COGNITIVE 
SCI. 79, 79–80 (2019). See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF 
SOCIAL MEDIA 5–6 (2017) (advocating for “an architecture of serendipity” as the ultimate way to 
salvage democracy, as “[t]o the extent that social media allow us to create our very own feeds, and 
essentially live in them, they create serious problems. . . . Self-insulation and personalization . . . spread 
falsehoods, and promote polarization and fragmentation”); ANAMITRA DEB ET AL., IS SOCIAL MEDIA A 
THREAT TO DEMOCRACY? 3–4 (2017), https://www.omidyargroup.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/Social-Media-and-Democracy-October-5-2017.pdf (reporting the six key 
features of social media that challenge democratic principles). 
2 Christopher Hare & Keith T. Poole, The Polarization of Contemporary American Politics, 46 
POLITY 411, 412 (2014). 
3 Shanto Iyengar & Sean J. Westwood, Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines: New Evidence on 
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surveys in 2014, deep antipathy toward one’s political outgroup grew by 
24% in the preceding decade among the American public, and nearly 32% 
of Americans saw the opposing party’s policies as threats to the nation or 
its well-being.4 These strong feelings have contributed to violent clashes, 
such as those between far-right political groups and liberals in New 
Orleans and Charlottesville.5 More generally, increasing affective group 
polarization has led to a decline in the kind of civil discourse that many 
hold to be a cornerstone of democracy.6 
While social media use is widely believed to contribute to growing 
polarization,7 data directly addressing this claim are scarce and in part lead 
to controversial interpretations and conclusions. As a result, the processes 
through which social media might exacerbate polarization are not well 
understood. We need to figure out the processes behind polarization in 
order to figure out what to do about it. Solutions require understanding. 
I. THESIS 
We propose here that moral outrage is central to understanding how 
social media use is related to affective group polarization. Moral outrage is 
an intense negative emotion combining anger and disgust triggered by a 
perception that someone violated a moral norm.8 Messages that describe or 
evoke moral outrage are increasingly prevalent in contemporary political 
contexts, especially those accusing political opponents of moral norm 
                                                                                                                     
Group Polarization, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 690, 690 (2015); Matt Motyl, Liberals and Conservatives Are 
(Geographically) Dividing, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF POLITICAL POLARIZATION 7, 21 (Piercarlo 
Valdesolo & Jesse Graham eds., 2016). 
4 Political Polarization in the American Public: Section 2: Growing Partisan Antipathy, PEW 
RES. CTR. (June 12, 2014), https://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/section-2-growing-partisan-
antipathy/.  
5 See Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, What Is Antifa? Explaining the Movement to Confront the Far 
Right, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/02/us/what-is-antifa.html 
(reporting on the movements of “antifa,” a contraction of the word “anti-fascist,” including protests in 
Charlottesville that turned violent); Alan Feuer & Jeremy W. Peters, Fringe Groups Revel as Protests 
Turn Violent, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/02/us/politics/white-
nationalists-alt-knights-protests-colleges.html (describing various groups’ attempts to mobilize, 
including that of the Proud Boys—a clan of conservative nationalists—in New Orleans over the 
removal of Confederate monuments). 
6 Jürgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, 1 CONSTELLATIONS 1, 7 (1994); 
WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, THINK AGAIN: HOW TO REASON AND ARGUE 2–4 (2018) [hereinafter, 
SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, THINK AGAIN]. 
7 Levi Boxell et al., Greater Internet Use Is Not Associated with Faster Growth in Political 
Polarization Among US Demographic Groups, 114 PNAS 10,612, 10,612–16 (2017); JOSHUA A. 
TUCKER ET AL., SOCIAL MEDIA, POLITICAL POLARIZATION, AND POLITICAL DISINFORMATION: A 
REVIEW OF THE SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE 3–5 (2018), https://hewlett.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/ 
Social-Media-Political-Polarization-and-Political-Disinformation-Literature-Review.pdf. 
8 Jessica M. Salerno & Liana C. Peter-Hagene, The Interactive Effect of Anger and Disgust on 
Moral Outrage and Judgments, 24 PSYCHOL. SCI. 2069, 2074 (2013).  
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violations.9 The moral nature of such messages makes them more likely to 
capture audiences’ attention10 and intensifies receivers’ emotional 
involvement.11 The resulting moral outrage is associated with especially 
stubborn political views12 and can even facilitate political violence.13   
Recent theorizing suggests that the design of social media platforms 
amplifies moral outrage by lowering the social costs associated with 
outrage and increasing its personal benefits,14 especially when moral 
content interacts with moral sensitivities to shape exposure to social media 
and subsequent behavior.15 Thus, moral outrage sparked by messages on 
social media and the internet more broadly is likely a crucial factor in 
explaining recent alarming trends in societal discourse and their 
consequences for increasing polarization and the decay of democratic 
norms. 
II. MODEL 
To understand affective group polarization, we propose a model 
describing how a mismatch between our evolutionary past and current 
social media amplifies moral outrage in online contexts. This, among other 
factors, leads to affective group polarization, involving group antagonism 
and dehumanization, which subsequently motivates social behaviors that 




                                                                                                                     
9 Spassena P. Koleva et al., Tracing the Threads: How Five Moral Concerns (Especially Purity) 
Help Explain Culture War Attitudes, 46 J. RES. PERSONALITY 184, 191–93 (2012). 
10 William J. Brady et al., Attentional Capture Helps Explain Why Moral and Emotional Content 
Go Viral, J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. GEN. 1, 4 (2019); Ana P. Gantman & Jay J. Van Bavel, The 
Moral Pop-Out Effect: Enhanced Perceptual Awareness of Morally Relevant Stimuli, 132 COGNITION 
22, 28 (2014). 
11 William J. Brady et al., Emotion Shapes the Diffusion of Moralized Content in Social Networks, 
114 PNAS 7313, 7316 (2017). 
12 Linda J. Skitka et al., Moral Conviction: Another Contributor to Attitude Strength or Something 
More?, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 895, 903 (2005) (testing “the degree that moral 
conviction was correlated” with political orientation). 
13 ALAN PAGE FISKE & TAGE SHAKTI RAI, VIRTUOUS VIOLENCE: HURTING AND KILLING TO 
CREATE, SUSTAIN, END, AND HONOR SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS 1–2 (2015) (discussing virtuous violence 
theory); Marlon Mooijman et al., Moralization in Social Networks and the Emergence of Violence 
During Protests, 2 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 389, 389 (2018). 
14 M. J. Crockett, Moral Outrage in the Digital Age, 1 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 769, 769–71 
(2017). 
15 Richard Huskey et al., Things We Know About Media and Morality, 2 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 
315, 315 (2018). 
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Figure 1: Proposed model of online moral outrage.
Our model begins with some fundamental sources of online moral 
outrage. Human psychology developed over evolutionary time in small 
communities, where observing egregious acts was a rare and noteworthy 
event. By contrast, the modern world, particularly with the development of 
social media, supplies a near-constant barrage of material that evokes 
moral outrage when political discussions occur. Other features of online 
contexts that exacerbate moral outrage include the psychological distance 
between conversation partners and the rarity of punitive consequences for 
bad behavior,16 as well as the predominantly written nature of online 
communication, which can intensify the emotional impact of messages.17 It 
was also much harder and more dangerous to leave one’s small community 
in evolutionary times than it is to drop out of online exchanges. This 
mismatch between the circumstances in which our ancestors evolved and 
the online worlds that many of us inhabit today plays a large role in 
instigating the problem of moral outrage online.
In the next stage of our model, online moral outrage leads to two 
psychological states that characterize affective group polarization: group
antagonism (antipathy toward groups of political opponents)18 and 
dehumanization (failure to recognize others’ human mental attributes).19
These psychological states then lead to three distinct social behaviors: 
aggression (behavior intended to harm another individual),20 sophistry 
                                                                                                                    
16 Crockett, supra note 14, at 769–71.
17 Huskey et al., supra note 15, at 315; Joseph B. Walther, Computer-Mediated Communication: 
Impersonal, Interpersonal, and Hyperpersonal Interaction, 23 COMM. RES. 3, 3–5, 7–8 (1996).
18 Shanto Iyengar & Sean J. Westwood, Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines: New Evidence on 
Group Polarization, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 690, 690, 704 (2015).
19 Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low: Neuroimaging 
Responses to Extreme Out-Groups, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 847, 847–48, 850 (2006); Nick Haslam, 
Dehumanization: An Integrative Review, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 252, 252–53 (2006).
20 ROBERT A. BARON & DEBORAH R. RICHARDSON, HUMAN AGGRESSION (PERSPECTIVES IN 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY) 7 (2d ed. 1994). 
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(using empty, misleading, or irrelevant arguments),21 and withdrawal 
(deliberately avoiding political participation, including voting, 
contribution, discussion, or even learning about political issues). These 
behaviors can threaten democracy by restricting communication, 
cooperation, civic participation, and the ability to react appropriately to 
political events.   
III. LINKS 
In order to test each link in this model, we need to pose a variety of 
research questions. We cannot answer any of these questions yet, but 
asking them will illuminate the central claims in our model and will show 
why we think our model is at least plausible.   
A. Does moral content increase moral outrage? 
Because moral outrage is triggered when a perceiver of a message 
believes an important moral norm has been violated, messages (e.g., 
tweets) without moral information are less likely to elicit moral outrage 
than messages that contain information about moral wrongdoing or moral 
conflict. In addition, the model of intuitive morality and exemplars 
(MIME)22 has shown that effects of social media messages are intensified 
when their content addresses violations or upholdings of moral norms that 
the audience endorses and sees as important.23 Furthermore, evidence from 
communication diffusion models repeatedly suggests that media effects are 
a function of both stimulus prevalence and stimulus density over a given 
time interval (e.g., the number of communicators or the number of message 
repetitions).24 Hence, the high prevalence and density of moral information 
and moral conflict in social media could help to explain why social media 
trigger such strong emotions.   
                                                                                                                     
21 See SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, THINK AGAIN, supra note 6, at 183–84 (discussing the sophistical 
fallacy of misleading others by jumping topics and avoiding the question asked).   
22 Ron Tamborini, Model of Intuitive Morality and Exemplars, in MEDIA AND THE MORAL MIND 
43, 43 (Ron Tamborini ed., 2015); Ron Tamborini & René Weber, Advancing the Model of Intuitive 
Morality and Exemplars, in THE HANDBOOK OF COMMUNICATION SCIENCE AND BIOLOGY 456, 456 
(Kory Floyd & René Weber eds., 2020). 
23 Tamborini, Model of Intuitive Morality and Exemplars, supra note 22, at 50–51; see also 
Graham J. Haidt et al., Moral Foundations Theory: The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism, in 47 
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 55, 82, 83 (James Olson ed., 2013) (discussing a 
study that showed individuals “were more likely . . . to favor those who personified virtues related to” 
ideals that are stereotypically valued by the side of the political spectrum with which the individual 
identified). 
24 See Ronald E. Rice, Intermediality and the Diffusion of Innovations, 43 HUM. COMM. RES. 531, 
531 (2017) (discussing the communication diffusion perspective of innovation). 
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B. Do social media amplify moral outrage? 
Moral outrage has been singled out as especially likely to occur in 
online political discourse.25 Although moral outrage can also occur in 
face-to-face interactions, several factors exacerbate its effects online. 
Offline, people rarely encounter egregious moral violations, but social 
media and other technologies allow people to become aware of others’ 
worst behaviors much more easily. People are highly motivated to express 
outrage about immoral actions, which makes such information especially 
likely to go viral.26 In addition, expressing outrage is easy online, because 
the target of the outrage need not be present, the potential for retaliation is 
minimal, and distant targets inspire less empathic concern.27 It is also easy 
to express outrage and leave the website without waiting for any response 
and, hence, without knowledge of how harmful one’s expression might 
have been. 
Data from previous studies using experience sampling28 suggest that 
people experience more intense outrage in response to immoral events that 
they encounter online compared to events that they encounter in person or 
via traditional media (e.g., TV, radio, newspaper).29 Spending time on 
social media would therefore seem to increase the likelihood of 
experiencing strong moral outrage. 
These effects might be moderated by other factors, including age and 
political ideology. Age is of particular interest in light of recent evidence 
that older Americans have shown the greatest increases in group 
antagonism in recent years, despite using the internet and social media the 
least;30 however, other evidence suggests that older adults who do use 
social media are the most polarized.31 Certain demographic groups, such as 
older people, may be more vulnerable to the exacerbation of online moral 
outrage than others, which may help to explain demographic asymmetries 
in polarization. Just as not everyone exposed to a virus will fall ill, not 
everyone exposed to partisan content online will be influenced in the same 
                                                                                                                     
25 See Crockett, supra note 14, at 769 (explaining how the internet facilitates the spread of moral 
outrage). 
26 Brady et al., supra note 11, at 7316.  
27 Crockett, supra note 14, at 770.  
28 MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, FLOW AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 21 
(2014) (“The Experience Sampling Method (ESM) is a research procedure for studying what people do, 
feel, and think during their daily lives.”). For examples of studies using experience sampling, see 
Crockett, supra note 14, at 770 and Wilhelm Hofmann et al., Morality in Everyday Life, 345 SCIENCE 
1340, 1340–41 (2014). 
29 Crockett, supra note 14, at 770. 
30 Boxell et al., supra note 7, at 10,612. 
31 Id.; see also National Politics on Twitter: Small Share of U.S. Adults Produce Majority of 
Tweets, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.people-press.org/2019/10/23/national-politics-on-
twitter-small-share-of-u-s-adults-produce-majority-of-tweets/ (concluding that older Americans are 
tweeting the most about national politics). 
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way. Because older adults show changes in brain systems related to 
processing social feedback,32 older adults could be differentially 
susceptible to online amplification of moral outrage.  
The specific mechanisms by which internet usage combines with 
evolved characteristics can be further specified. For instance, it is well 
documented in the literature that repeated exposure to media, including 
social media, influences emotions and behaviors by altering the salience of 
moral and political content.33 In a 2010 study by Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, 
and Giner-Sorolla, content that emphasized in-group glorification reduced 
the demands for justice when a violent perpetrator was an in-group 
member.34 Moreover, this effect was mediated by moral disengagement 
(de-emphasizing suffering by victims’ families and dehumanizing victims), 
which in turn is linked to violence and terrorism.35  
The MIME mentioned above suggests that, over time, exposure to a 
consistent communication diet emphasizing the superiority of one moral 
intuition over another will either increase the salience of the emphasized 
intuitions or maintain their salience in the face of opposing influences. 
According to the MIME, polarization is expected in relatively closed 
systems, where outside influence is limited or blocked (such as in 
fundamentalist religious or political groups); whereas self-regulation is 
more likely in relatively open systems where external factors exert 
opposing forces (as in social media networks with fast and inexpensive 
information). The MIME holds that more isolated communicative 
networks with insulation from value-inconsistent messages should foster 
polarized values within such groups, intensify responses to moral conflicts 
between groups, and reduce openness to divergent views. Several studies 
have found these predicted effects in media content produced for and 
consumed by sub-groups that differ by age, political interest and 
orientation, moral intuition salience, culture, location, and dosage of 
exposure.36  
                                                                                                                     
32 See Lars Bäckman et al., The Correlative Triad Among Aging, Dopamine, and Cognition: 
Current Status and Future Prospects, 30 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 791, 797 (2006); 
Jean-Claude Dreher et al., Age-Related Changes in Midbrain Dopaminergic Regulation of the Human 
Reward System, 105 PNAS 15,106, 15,109 (2008); Ben Eppinger et al., Reduced Striatal Responses to 
Reward Prediction Errors in Older Compared with Younger Adults, 33 J. NEUROSCIENCE 9905, 9908 
(2013); Shu-Chen Li et al., Dopaminergic Modulation of Cognition Across the Life Span, 34 
NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 625, 628 (2010).  
33 William J. Brady, Killian McLoughlin & Molly J. Crockett, Theory-Driven Measurement of 
Emotion (Expressions) in Social Media Text, in THE ATLAS OF LANGUAGE ANALYSIS IN PSYCHOLOGY 
(Morteza Dehghani & Ryan Boyd eds.) (forthcoming) (manuscript at 17). 
34 Bernhard Leidner et al., Ingroup Glorification, Moral Disengagement, and Justice in the 
Context of Collective Violence, 36 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1115, 1116 (2010). 
35 E.g., Alfred L. McAlister et al., Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in Support of Military 
Force: The Impact of September 11, 25 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 141, 162–63 (2006). 
36 For an overview, see Tamborini & Weber, supra note 22, at 457–58. 
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C. Does digital outrage increase group antagonism? 
Antagonism is not mere partisan disagreement. It involves hatred of 
political opponents in contrast to civil, substantive disputes about values 
and policies.37 Our model concerns antagonism rather than civil 
disagreement. 
Antagonism is related to moral outrage in that they both involve 
intensely negative emotions. However, whereas moral outrage is usually a 
response to an individual person or behavior, political antagonism is often 
directed against groups. Such political group antagonism is characterized 
by feelings of hostility towards the other political party and by beliefs that 
the other party is dangerous or evil. What began as a negative feeling 
towards an individual person or act grows into antagonism to their entire 
group. 
D. Does digital outrage lead to dehumanization? 
Dehumanization is a process of denying a person abilities and 
tendencies that are typical of human mental life.38 It is distinct from 
antagonism in that it is possible to hate someone without dehumanizing 
them and vice versa.39 However, we hypothesize that antagonism and 
dehumanization can feed one another and co-occur in the context of 
contentious political discourse online.  
Dehumanization takes two distinct forms: a target can be denied 
agency (the ability to make reasonable decisions) or feeling (the ability to 
suffer).40 People see the other side as “less than human”41 either in their 
ability to reason or in their ability to feel pain. Both kinds of 
dehumanization can be a consequence of moral outrage, largely because of 
its emotional element of disgust, which is associated with 
                                                                                                                     
37 Shanto Iyengar et al., Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization, 76 
PUB. OPINION Q. 405, 405, 408, 421 (2012). 
38 Nick Haslam, Dehumanization: An Integrative Review, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
REV. 252, 252, 254 (2006); see also Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of 
the Low: Neuroimaging Responses to Extreme Out-Groups, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 847, 847 (2006) (“[W]e 
present new social neuroscience data indicating that extreme forms of prejudice may deny their targets 
even full humanity.”). 
39 Tage S. Rai et al., Dehumanization Increases Instrumental Violence, but Not Moral 
Violence, 114 PNAS 8511, 8514–15 (2017). 
40 See Mengyao Li, Bernhard Leidner & Emanuele Castano, Toward a Comprehensive Taxonomy 
of Dehumanization: Integrating Two Senses of Humanness, Mind Perception Theory, and Stereotype 
Content Model, 21 TPM 285, 287 (2014) (defining “agency” as “the capacity for planning and acting” 
and defining “experience” as “the capacity for desires and feelings”). For further discussion of 
experience and agency, see Heather M. Gray et al., Dimensions of Mind Perception, 315 SCIENCE 619, 
619 (2007). 
41 Madeleine Dalsklev & Jonas Rønningsdalen Kunst, The Effect of Disgust-Eliciting Media 
Portrayals on Outgroup Dehumanization and Support of Deportation in a Norwegian Sample, 47 INT’L 
J. INTERCULTURAL REL. 28, 29 (2015).  
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dehumanization.42 Studies have also found that communication by text as 
opposed to voice leads to greater dehumanization,43 so the fact that most 
online communication takes the form of writing might increase its 
contribution to dehumanization.  
On the other hand, recent evidence suggests that people do not 
dehumanize the victims of violence when those victims are perceived as 
immoral, which is likely to be the case in the context of political conflict.44 
Perceiving someone as immoral in fact usually requires perceiving them as 
having nefarious or malicious intentions, which are human mental states. 
Merely humanizing opponents by ascribing some mental states to them is 
then not enough to forestall antagonism and aggression towards them.45 
Beliefs that they have bad intentions can instead make their suffering seem 
less aversive and increase antagonism and aggression towards them.46 In 
this way, inaccurate perceptions of others’ mental states can sometimes be 
just as pernicious as dehumanization.  
The sources of group antagonism and dehumanization need to be 
determined in order to design remedies. Many proposed interventions on 
affective group polarization (such as those designed to increase empathy 
for political opponents) are predicated on the assumption that affective 
polarization leads people to spontaneously generate limited, simplistic 
theories about their opponents’ motivations or emotions. These 
interventions are unlikely to succeed if their assumptions are inaccurate.47 
E. How can we test these links? 
To verify or falsify these assumptions, we need to measure 
relationships among outrage, group antagonism, and dehumanization 
among social media users. This task can now be approached with tools that 
have become available only recently, such as natural language processing48 
                                                                                                                     
42 Id. at 29, 37–38; Katrina M. Fincher & Philip E. Tetlock, Perceptual Dehumanization of Faces 
Is Activated by Norm Violations and Facilitates Norm Enforcement, 145 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 
131, 132 (2016); Harris & Fiske, supra note 38, at 852. 
43 Juliana Schroeder et al., The Humanizing Voice: Speech Reveals, and Text Conceals, a More 
Thoughtful Mind in the Midst of Disagreement, 28 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1745, 1746, 1760 (2017). 
44 Rai et al., supra note 39, at 8513–14. 
45 Id. at 8512.  
46 Id. at 8511–12.  
47 See Scott Barry Kaufman, Can Empathic Concern Actually Increase Political Polarization?, 
SCI. AM. (Nov. 6, 2019), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/beautiful-minds/can-empathic-concern-
actually-increase-political-polarization/ (discussing how biases are likely to increase hostility toward 
the “outgroup”). 
48 Frederic R. Hopp et al., The Extended Moral Foundations Dictionary (eMFD): Development 
and Applications of a Crowd-Sourced Approach to Extracting Moral Intuitions from Text, BEHAV. RES. 
METHODS 2 (2020), https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-020-01433-0; CHRISTOPHER D. MANNING & 
HINRICH SCHÜTZE, FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICAL NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING 4 (1999); Eyal 
Sagi & Morteza Dehghani, Measuring Moral Rhetoric in Text, 32 SOC. SCI. COMPUTER REV. 132, 142 
 
 
1118 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:3 
and supervised learning classification.49 We predict that these tools can be 
used to uncover a positive relationship between expressions of moral 
outrage online and language that expresses antagonism towards groups and 
that dehumanizes opponents, such as by referring to them as animals.50 We 
also predict that social reinforcement of expressions of moral outrage (in 
the form of “likes” and “retweets”) will increase subsequent use of 
antagonistic and dehumanizing language in online discourse so that 
participants who receive the greatest amount of positive social feedback 
when they express moral outrage in their social media posts will show the 
highest levels of antagonism and dehumanization. Evidence for these 
predictions would support the corresponding links in our model between 
online moral outrage and the two psychological mediators: group 
antagonism and dehumanization. 
F. Does online moral outrage lead to aggression? 
Our model’s next set of research questions asks whether moral outrage, 
through the mediators of both group antagonism and dehumanization, will 
lead to certain behaviors. Our model focuses on three actions: aggression, 
sophistry, and withdrawal.   
To understand online aggression, recall that moral outrage begins as a 
negative emotional reaction to a single individual’s act,51 whereas 
antagonism is directed towards a group.52 The transition from moral 
outrage to antagonism thus involves the spreading of negative feeling from 
one person to their entire group.  
Anger at outgroups is associated with prejudice53 and has been shown 
to be related specifically to disliking political outgroups more and 
tolerating them less.54 Therefore, higher levels of moral outrage tend to 
lead to higher levels of prejudice and intolerance towards groups 
                                                                                                                     
(2013); René Weber et al., Extracting Latent Moral Information from Text Narratives: Relevance, 
Challenges, and Solutions, 12 COMM. METHODS & MEASURES 119, 124, 137 (2018). 
49 Brady, McLoughlin & Crockett, supra note 33 (manuscript at 6–9). 
50 See, e.g., Florian Arendt & Narin Karadas, Content Analysis of Mediated Associations: An 
Automated Text-Analytic Approach, 11 COMM. METHODS & MEASURES 105, 112 (2017) (analyzing the 
use of animal-related terms over a four-month period to demonstrate the dehumanization of Muslims in 
German news coverage of Islam). 
51 See Salerno & Peter-Hagene, supra note 8, at 2069 (closely linking moral outrage with anger). 
52 See Giulia Evolvi, #Islamexit: Inter-Group Antagonism on Twitter, 22 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 
386, 397 (2019) (studying group antagonism through anti-Muslim tweets during the Brexit debate in 
the United Kingdom). 
53 Nilanjana Dasgupta et al., Fanning the Flames of Prejudice: The Influence of Specific 
Incidental Emotions on Implicit Prejudice, 9 EMOTION 585, 589 (2009). 
54 Linda J. Skitka et al., Political Tolerance and Coming to Psychological Closure Following the 
September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks: An Integrative Approach, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 743, 754 (2004). 
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associated with the particular source of the moral outrage and then to 
representatives of those groups. 
As a result, it seems likely that increased group antagonism will make 
people more willing to act aggressively to individual members of opposing 
groups based on group membership. Similarly, previous research has found 
that dehumanization is strongly associated with aggression, such that when 
a person perceives opponents as lacking feeling, they become more willing 
to inflict harm against opponents through bullying or harassment.55 
Therefore, dehumanization, particularly a lack of concern for the feelings 
of the target, would also seem to lead to aggression, at least in some cases. 
G. Does online moral outrage increase sophistry? 
Moral outrage also seems to lead people to engage in sophistry, or bad 
arguments, partly because one component of outrage is anger, which 
impairs judgment and decision making.56 Ideally, the purpose of presenting 
arguments is to increase understanding of opposing points of view 
(including why others hold those positions) as well as to influence beliefs 
and attitudes on both sides of a controversy.57 However, for many people 
talking about politics in social media, the focus is instead on competition 
and provocation (beating opponents by embarrassing, exhausting, or 
bewildering them) or theater (appearing more intelligent to observers who 
are allies or potential allies).58 Even when people intend to create good 
arguments against opposing positions (or for their own), they often miss 
their targets because of a simplistic understanding of their opponents. This 
tendency seems to be exacerbated by higher levels of antagonism and 
dehumanization, which leads people to adopt a competitive or theatrical 
mindset during political discussions online, resulting in sophistry. 
H. Does online moral outrage motivate withdrawal? 
For the same reasons that moral outrage is galvanizing for some 
people, it leads others to withdraw from politics.59 Intense animus can be 
overwhelming and unpleasant and will motivate many people to withdraw 
                                                                                                                     
55 Albert Bandura et al., Disinhibition of Aggression Through Diffusion of Responsibility and 
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56 Jennifer S. Lerner & Larissa Z. Tiedens, Portrait of the Angry Decision Maker: How Appraisal 
Tendencies Shape Anger’s Influence on Cognition, 19 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 115, 132 (2006). 
57 SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, THINK AGAIN, supra note 6, at 56. 
58 See, e.g., Ashley A. Anderson & Heidi E. Huntington, Social Media, Science, and Attack 
Discourse: How Twitter Discussions of Climate Change Use Sarcasm and Incivility, 39 SCI. COMM. 
598, 600 (2017) (analyzing the use of sarcastic or uncivilized rhetoric in online discourse surrounding 
climate change). 
59 Elizabeth A. Bennett et al., Disavowing Politics: Civic Engagement in an Era of Political 
Skepticism, 119 AM. J. SOC. 518, 518–19 (2013).  
 
1120 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:3 
in order to avoid or reduce associated negative emotions.60 It is not clear 
what leads one person to become aggressive and another person to 
withdraw, but various individual differences might moderate these effects, 
such as the degree to which people experience moral outrage as unpleasant. 
In any case, antagonism and dehumanization by politically active people 
seem to lead some people into cynicism or apathy about politics. Just as 
many people effortfully avoid feeling sympathy for widespread suffering 
out of a desire to avoid emotional exhaustion,61 so many people are 
motivated to avoid engaging with politics in order to keep from 
experiencing the hostility that characterizes contemporary partisan politics. 
They see politics as unpleasant, difficult, and exhausting; they foresee few 
compensating benefits for engaging in political activity, especially because 
of the sophistry and vicious attacks that characterize so much of political 
discourse online. For such reasons, both antagonism and dehumanization 
seem to lead many people to withdraw from politics—and understandably 
so. 
IV. IMPACT 
Many claims in our model remain speculations in need of further 
empirical support, but it could prove important and useful. If even 
approximately correct, our proposed model and its further specifications 
could illuminate the sources of many unpleasant psychological states and 
politically harmful behaviors on social media and elsewhere. It could help 
us understand an important social problem by providing a greater sense of 
the emotional and cognitive factors that lead people to behave badly when 
engaging in politics online. Because we need to understand a problem 
before we can solve it, our model could also potentially guide interventions 
that reduce political polarization and ensuing social problems.  
All of this remains to be seen, because our model so far is only that: a 
hypothesized model—an educated guess. We would never claim to have 
established it as accurate. Much more research needs to be done to test it. 
All we can claim for now is that we find it plausible, promising, and 
potentially useful. We hope that others do, too. 
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